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Abstract 
The Irish rebellion of 1798 is pivotal in Irish history. The ideas of the French Revolution contributed 
greatly to the development of Irish republicanism in the 1790s, when the United Irishmen began their 
struggle for an independent, republican Ireland. But the French also contributed in practical manner, by 
providing military aid in the form of two expeditions to Ireland in 1796 and 1798. This thesis analyses 
why the French Directory, the executive power during this period, decided to support the Irish, and if it 
fits within the framework of sister republics. The findings of the thesis suggest that the rhetoric the 
Directory used to justify the first expedition combined Republican ideals, such as liberating the Irish 
people from oppression and establishing a republican system of government, with war-strategic 
arguments such as using Ireland as a weapon to defeat France’s great enemy, England. However, the 
plan to use a guerrilla-warfare strategy, a chouannerie, in Ireland, with the aim to cause chaos and civil 
war, shows that Republican ideals were ultimately not the priority for the promoters of the Irish 
expedition, Carnot and Hoche. Before the second expedition, the political circumstances were very 
disadvantageous to the Irish cause, and the only way the French would help Ireland again was when they 
were to rise on their own. When this ultimately happened, the idea of an Irish revolution was enough to 
justify another expedition, and the Directory reached back to the rhetoric of the 1796 expedition. 
Moreover, the establishment of the Republic of Connacht shows that there was an attempt to establish a 
republican system, and the republican rhetoric was thus not uttered in vain. A successful invasion of 
Ireland might thus have led to an Irish sister-republic; however, the prominence of French interests in the 
event of an Irish revolution, the focus on English defeat and the chouannerie strategy show that the 
promotion of Republican ideals was not priority for the Directory.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 Well, England has not had such an escape since the Spanish Armada … now 
that all is lost, I am as eager to get back to France as I was to come to Ireland.  
 - Theobald Wolfe Tone, 26 December 17961 
 
With these words, Theobald Wolfe Tone, one of the key figures of the United Irishmen and of 
the Irish Rebellion of 1798, seems to give up on his great mission: to sail with French troops 
to Ireland, start an Irish Revolution, and separate his country from England. He writes this on 
26 December 1796, when the decision has just been made by French officers on his ship to 
turn backwards to Brest, an important military port on the Atlantic coast of France. Tone sees 
his dream falling apart and already makes plans to live as a peasant somewhere in France.2  
 But the 1796 expedition to Ireland was just the beginning. The idea of French aid for a 
rebellion was firmly planted into the minds of the United Irishmen. This society, which had 
started out as a moderate reform organization greatly influenced by the rationalist and 
libertarian ideals of the French revolutionaries, had re-invented itself in 1795 to become an 
underground, militant society determined to gain independence from England and become a 
republic. In 1798 they instigated an uprising in different parts of Ireland, which was put down 
violently by the English military. A second French expedition providing arms and men 
arrived too late to help the Irish rebels and ultimately failed. Tone, who was also a part of this 
second mission, was captured and committed suicide in a Dublin prison before he was to be 
publicly hanged.3 Ultimately, the uprising was detrimental to the cause of Irish independence: 
Ireland lost its parliament in the Act of the Union, and all decisions were made in 
Westminster from then on.4    
																																																						
1 WTWT ii, p. 432, 26 December 1792. 
2 Ibid. 
3 M. Elliott, Wolfe Tone: Second Edition (Liverpool, 2012), p. 385. 
4 M. Cronin, A History of Ireland (New York, 2001), pp. 104-107. 
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 The rebellion of 1798 is pivotal in Irish history. Historians argue that it changed the 
course of the nation’s history and provided a legacy of heroes, myths and an ideology of 
militant republicanism for future Irish nationalists.5 But is also makes sense to take the French 
Revolution as the event that changed the course of Irish history, as Mike Cronin suggests: The 
French Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic, and the republican ideology had 
a huge influence on the United Irishmen.6  Moreover, the steady hope for – and to a certain 
extent the promise of – French military aid kept the republican spirit alive in the second half 
of the 1790s. This thesis will focus on this French support for the Irish rebels, in order to find 
out why the French government sent two French expeditions to Ireland, in 1796 and in 
1798. Motivation is a notoriously difficult term to use, since it is never possible to look into 
someone’s mind and really know why a decision has been made. This is why this thesis will 
discuss the justifications that the French government used, the reasons the government gave 
for their decisions. How did the French government justify sending French troops to Ireland? 
What rhetoric did they use? Finally, the thesis will explore the political implications of these 
expeditions in France.  
 Marianne Elliott has been a pioneer in the historiography on the French-Irish 
connection, with works such as Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France and 
Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence.7 Until then, the historiography on Ireland and 
France was rather thin, focused mostly on Irish soldiers in French service. As Thomas Bartlett 
states, Elliott’s Partners in Revolution ‘put the historiography of Franco-Irish relations on a 
completely new footing.’8 Elliott argues that the United Irishmen cannot be treated in a purely 
Irish context, as its association with France informed its development after 1795 into a radical, 
																																																						
5 EP, p. xiii; Cronin, A History, p. 113; H. Gough, ‘The French Revolution and Europe 1789-1799’ in H. Gough 
and D. Dickson ed., Ireland and the French Revolution (Dublin, 1990), p. 1.  
6 Cronin, A History, p. 104. 
7 EP; M. Elliot, Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence (London, 1990). 
8 T. Bartlett, ‘Avant propos/Foreword: Writing the history of the revolutionary 1790s during “Troubles”: 
historiographical and moral dilemmas’, La Révolution française 11 (2016), pp. 1-3. 
	 6	
republican organization, and thus the French influence should be taken into account as well. 
Nevertheless, Elliott focuses mostly on the Irish side of the connection: the organization of 
the United Irishmen, Tone as the United Irishmen’s negotiator in France and issues of 
sectarianism in Ireland. She describes the Irish desire to rebel, but does not elaborate on the 
French motivation to support such a rebellion. She classifies French aid as a war strategy 
based on anglophobia, leaving little space for idealist reasons, such as internationalist ideas of 
spreading republicanism to other countries, or simply wanting to help the Irish. This thesis 
will go deeper into the justifications used by the French to explain their decisions for the two 
expeditions. Moreover, while Elliott describes the aftermath of the failed rebellion of 1798 for 
Ireland, this thesis will examine the role that the military expeditions played within French 
politics at that time and what the consequences of their failure were in France.  
 Many general works on modern Irish history start with the 1790s, such as Jackson’s 
Ireland 1798-1998 and Ó Tuathaigh with Ireland before the famine 1798-1848, which 
indicates the importance of this period in Irish history.9 Most discussions on the 1798 
rebellion focus on internal issues at play in Ireland, such as sectarian violence, agrarian 
disturbances, internal parliamentary affairs, the interplay between Westminster and Ireland 
and the rights of Catholics. This is also the case for the studies that focus specifically on the 
United Irishmen and the rebellion, such as Nancy Curtin’s The United Irishmen and 
Revolution, Counter-revolution and Union by Jim Smyth.10 The role of France in the different 
phases leading up to the 1798 uprising, and their military support are mentioned by all of 
them, albeit from an Irish perspective. 
In the historiography of the French Revolution, Ireland is characterised as one of many 
European countries where uprisings occurred that were inspired by the French Revolution, 
																																																						
9 G. Ó Tuathaigh, Ireland Before the Famine, 1798-1848 (Dublin, 1972); A. Jackson, Ireland, 1798-1998 
(Oxford, 2000). 
10 N. Curtin, The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798 (Oxford, 1994); J. Smyth, 
Revolution, Counter-revolution and Union (Cambridge, 2000).   
	 7	
with the 1798 rebellion being the final French-inspired rebellion and among the deadliest.11 
Studies on the Atlantic Revolutions in particular focus primarily on the American Revolution 
and the French ‘sister republics’. The United Irishmen and the failed missions to support the 
Irish insurrection are only discussed in terms of the war between England and France: Ireland 
is not seen as a possible sister republic.12 Moreover, R.R. Palmer places the French support for 
Ireland in the context of the French Revolutionary Wars, particularly the war with Great 
Britain. Ireland is characterised as part of the French war strategy against England, not as a 
natural ally of France, who had to be supported out of moral or ideological obligation.13  Ultan 
Gillen describes the impact of the French Revolution, stating that it changed Ireland for good, 
referring specifically to the republican ideals inspiring the United Irishmen.14 
 The thesis is largely based on a variety of sources concerning the French government. 
The period that will be discussed, from 1795 to 1798, saw a new executive body being 
installed, the Directoire Executif or Directory. Therefore, the sources of the National Archives 
of France on the Directory are used. The register of the minutes of the Directory, which has 
been published, is used extensively; it provides information on the day to day deliberations of 
the Directory, including secret meetings, official statements and instructions.15 Other material 
used consists of mostly correspondence, including memoranda describing the political 
situation in Ireland and letters to and from the generals Hoche and Humbert, who led the 1796 
and 1798 expeditions respectively.  
The General Secretariat preserved the original documents of the Directory of the 
minutes and orders, together with supporting documents from ministries and the ‘Corps 
																																																						
11 W. Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford, 1989), pp. 341-343. 
12 P. Serna, Republiques soeur: Le Directoire et la Révolutioin atlantique (Paris, 2008); P. Bourdin and J. 
Chappey ed., Révoltes et révolutions en Europe et aux Amériques, 1773—1802 (Paris, 2005). 
13 R.R. Palmer, Age of the Democratic Revolution: A political history of Europe and America, 1760-1800 
(Princeton, 1969), p. 499; I. Coller, ‘Egypt in the French Revolution’ in S. Desan et al. ed., The French 
Revolution in Global Perspective (New York, 2013), p. 115. 
14 U. Gillen, ‘Le Directoire et le républicanisme irlandais’ in Serna, Republiques soeur, p. 315.  
15 A. Debidour, Recueil des actes du Directoire executif,: proces-verbaux, arrêtes, instructions, lettres et actes 
divers, Tome 1-4 (Paris, 1910-1917). 
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législative’, which would later become the AF/III series.16 The rule to turn all documents to 
the General Secretariat did not apply to papers of military and diplomatic interest. These have 
been preserved in the Diplomatic Archives and the Defence Archives in Paris.17 Since the 
Ministry of External Relations was highly involved in the Irish cause, predominantly with 
secret agents, information gathering and arranging for United Irishmen to come to Paris, the 
following sources from the Diplomatic Archives are used extensively: political 
correspondence concerning England (of which Ireland was considered part), including secret 
communication, and various memoranda and documents. The thesis also uses several 
documents from the Defence Archives, specifically their folder on the Irish expeditions of 
1796 and 1798, and a published work of the correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte of the 
year 1798-1799, which adds to the context of the Irish expeditions.18 These are largely 
unedited, original documents that contribute to the understanding of this period of French 
history.  
There are certain limits to these sources. It is never possible to know exactly what has 
not been written down, or has not been conserved and archived. This is a challenge since the 
aim of this thesis is to analyse the Directory’s motivations, which have not always been 
written down: sometimes the order was just issued. Another limitation, specifically when it 
comes to the second expedition in 1798, is that less material is available. It is harder to find 
out the motivations for the Directory to send troops to the Irish for this period, because there 
are fewer documents mentioning the expedition at all, due to the short term in which it was 
ordered and executed.  
																																																						
16 For a detailed history of the conservation of the archives see: Présentation des archives, sous-série AF/III: 
Directoire Executif [https://www.siv.archives-
nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/pog/consultationPogN3.action?nopId=c614xe0
077q--1n7fbkmrb0pd1&pogId=FRAN_POG_04&search=] (accessed on 4 May, 2017).  
17 Ibid.  
18 La Fondation Bonaparte, Napoleon Bonaparte: Correspondence générale, Tome II: La Campagne d’Égypte et 
L’Avènement 1798-1799 (Paris, 2005).   
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For this reason, the thesis also analyses Tone’s autobiography, to complement the 
‘official’ approach of the Directory with the personal experience of Wolfe Tone as he 
engaged with their decisions while in Paris. Four volumes of The Writings of Theobald Wolfe 
Tone 1763-1798, a set of published primary sources, are used. It consists of all of Tone’s 
(surviving) writings, including his autobiography and diary, with letters to him and several 
contemporary documents relating to his career. It is an edited work, but the editors have kept 
the works as close to the original documents as possible.19 Throughout the thesis, all 
Republican dates have been converted to the Gregorian calendar.20 
An important concept within this thesis is republicanism, since it bound together the 
French and the United Irishmen in an ideological connection. What the French had already 
achieved, the establishment of a republican state, was what the United Irishmen were striving 
for. Because of this connection, the Irish revolutionaries saw France as their guide and ally. 
Republicanism as a form of government is defined as support for a republican system of 
government, in which supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives, 
and not by a monarch:21‘repudiating the age-old belief that monarchy is necessarily the best 
form of government’.22 
In this thesis, French republicanism and Irish republicanism are of importance. The 
French republican ideology was founded upon the events of the French Revolution and the 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du citoyen of 1789 and its values of liberty, equality 
and civic virtue.23 The commonly held view of historians is that while the French Revolution 
was inspired and deeply influenced by the Enlightenment, republicanism and republican ideas 
																																																						
19 WTWT iii, p. v.  
20 Online converter, ‘The Republican Calendar’ [https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/the-
republican-calendar/?r_jour2=27&r_mois2=12&r_an2=4]. 
21 P.O. Caresse, ‘Republicanism’ in A.C. Kors, Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment (Oxford, 2005), 
[http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2232/view/10.1093/acref/9780195104301.001.0001/acref-
9780195104301-e-605?rskey=5iD7NR&result=3] (accessed on 8 June, 2017). 
22 M. van Gelderen & Q. Skinner ed., Republicanism, A Shared European Heritage, Volume I (Cambridge, 
2002), p. 1. 
23Y. Mény, ‘Republicanism: a transatlantic misunderstanding’in R. Elgie et al. ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
French Politics (Oxford, 2016), pp. 13-42 at p. 12. 
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did not play a central role in this: most philosophes believed in monarchy.24 Wright however 
sees this view as a myth and the Enlightenment as pivotal in the history of republicanism: 
‘The moment when an old and august tradition of political thought underwent a fascinating 
process of modernization, with dramatic historical consequences.’25 The republican spirit of 
the French Revolution was informed by a loose tradition of writers, such as Machiavelli, 
Montesquieu, and Americans of the founding era, such as Jefferson and Madison with 
common ideas: ‘An empire of law; a mixed constitution, in which different powers serve to 
check and balance each other; and a regime of civic virtue, under which people are disposed 
to serve honestly in public office.’26 
The First Republic of France was only created on 21 September 1792, when the 
National Convention met for the first time and formally abolished the monarchy, as a 
consequence of the royal family’s flight and the deep hatred for the monarchy it caused. No 
mention of the ‘République’ is made before this date.27 So although the French republican 
ideology is based on Enlightenment ideas, and  has been developed during the Revolution, the 
idea of creating a republic only came into being three years later. Thus, although not rooted in 
anti-monarchical sentiments, French republicanism during the 1790s did signify a government 
abolishing monarchy, but also the nobility, feudal privileges and tithes, which were to be 
replaced by a parliament and (relatively) free political press.28 The Revolution and the 
establishment of the First Republic in 1792, without a monarch as the highest authority, 
inspired other republican movements in Europe. One of these was the United Irishmen 
Society.  
																																																						
24 J. K. Wright, ‘The Enlightenment’ in E. Berenson et al. ed., The French Republic: History, Values, Debates 
(London, 2011), p. 11.  
25 Ibid., p. 12. 
26 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), p. 20. 
27 P. Gueniffey, ‘The First Republic’ in Berenson, The French Republic, p. 11. 
28 Gough, ‘The French Revolution and Europe’, pp. 4-7.  
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There were few outspoken anti-monarchial republicans in eighteenth-century Ireland 
until the late 1790s, but there was no lack of Enlightenment ideas and arguments, which 
inspired Irish Patriotism. Patriotism is a broad political description for a variety of protestant 
political figures who were concerned with economic improvement and Irish legislative rights. 
This was done in conservative and moderate ways, but republican patriotism became 
increasingly dominant in eighteenth-century Ireland.29 Tone and the United Irishmen started 
their society in 1791 with a reformed parliament as their goal; a republic or a separation of 
Ireland was not on their minds at that time. They were inspired by the ideas of the French 
Revolution, of liberty and equality, but did not seek a republican government.  The United 
Irishmen were the first to develop the concept of one nation in Ireland, irrespective of national 
origin or religion: a historical breakthrough in the sectarian Irish society.30 In the second half 
of the 1790s a ‘radical’ republicanism became much more common: “more egalitarian, more 
democratic, and tentatively republican in the strict anti-monarchical sense.’31 Complete 
separation from Britain became the goal of this new Irish republicanism. As such, Tone is 
recognized as “the founder of Irish republican nationalism.”32 
 The society of United Irishmen was only one of several republican movements 
influenced by the French Revolution and French republicanism. But next to the inspiration it 
provided, the French Republic also actively supported such movements. Therefore, 
internationalism is another important concept: the idea of the French Revolution as the 
starting point of revolutions all over Europe and the active support of the French government 
for republican movements in other countries. R.R. Palmer, who uses the term ‘international 
revolutionalism’, argues that revolutionaries in other countries accomplished nothing except 
when given support by French armies, yet this term should not be seen in the same way as 
																																																						
29 S. Small, Political Thought in Ireland 1776-1798: Republicanism, Patriotism, and Radicalism (Oxford, 2002) 
pp. 23-32. 
30 Elliott, Wolfe Tone, pp. 1-3.  
31 Small, Political Thought, pp. 226-227.  
32 Elliott, Wolfe Tone, p. 1.  
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twentieth-century international communism: there was never any concerted international 
organization directed from Paris, or a French propaganda office. France issued the famous 
November decree in 1792, offering fraternity and assistance to all peoples wishing to recover 
their liberty, but the decree was laid to rest the following year, when politicians such as 
Robespierre rose to power and propagated to strengthen the French Republic first, before 
offering support to foreign republican movements.33  
 However, after the fall of Robespierre and the Thermadorian reaction, French 
internationalism took another turn with the establishment of ‘sister republics’, republican 
governments that were established and/or supported by the French government. In the period 
after the fall of Robespierre and before Napoleon’s coup d’état, roughly the beginning of 
1795 until the end of 1798, these included the Netherlands (the Batavian Republic), Italy (the 
Cisalpine, Ligurian, Roman and Parthenopean Republics) and Switzerland (the Helvetic 
Republic).34 The revolution and the French republican ideals were exported to other European 
countries, in most cases by force of arms. The concept of internationalism was put into 
practice.  In this thesis the concept of internationalism is defined as: active (military) support 
of the French government for republican movements in other countries.  
By analysing the justification for support of the United Irishmen and the political 
decision-making process that it involved, this thesis contributes to clarify this definition of 
internationalism and discuss to what extent this term is applicable to the French government 
policy during the 1790s. Does Ireland fit into the sister republic concept? Was the idea of 
making Ireland another sister republic the impetus for France to send military aid? The Irish 
rebellion of 1798 has had a huge impact on Irish nationalism and on Irish history in general. 
French influences and the hope for French aid were an important factor in the rebellion. The 
																																																						
33 EP, p. 52. 
34 J. Oddens et al. ed., The Political Culture of the Sister Republics, 1794-1806 (Amsterdam, 2015), pp. 9-14; 
Doyle, The Oxford History, p. 345. 
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rebellion of 1798, although a complete failure, saw Irish nationalists associating France with 
concepts and themes that would stick until the early 20th century: the idea of France as the 
protector of oppressed nationalities and as Ireland’s natural ally in its struggle against 
England – and later the United Kingdom.35 In this thesis the object is to deconstruct and 
analyse this image of France as a liberator, and to place the decisions to support Ireland 
within the political context of the 1790s. It will also add to the understanding of the failure of 
France to support the 1798 rebellion by analysing the decision-making process on the French 
side.  
 The thesis is divided into three chapters, chronologically arranged. Firstly, a short 
history of the French-Irish connections before the French Revolution, and a reconstruction of 
the political situation of both Ireland and France in the beginning of the 1790s. The second 
chapter concerns the decision-making process leading up to the 1796 expedition and the 
consequences of its failure. The third chapter will analyse the foundations for the 1798 
expedition. The focus will be on the justifications the government gives for the support to 
Ireland and in what ways this can be placed in the political context of that time
																																																						
35 P. Ranger, ‘Les representations de la France dans l'Irlande nationaliste, de l'avènement de 
Parnell à la création de l'Etat Libre’ (Pd.D. thesis, Université Paris-Est, 2009), p. 6. 
	
	
Chapter 1:  From trade ties to republican nexus 
1.1 A pre-revolutionary history of French-Irish connections  
France and Ireland have a long common history, with military, commercial and political ties 
bounding the two countries together. Prior to the 1520s no political ties of importance existed; 
virtually all contact between France and Ireland concerned trade. These trade links were 
small-scale by contemporary standards, as Ireland was perceived by the French as a 
peripheral, underdeveloped country with a dangerous coastline and rough seaways, and 
therefore not as an attractive trading partner. Nevertheless, Ireland maintained commercial 
relations with French ports throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries – the 
crucial foundations on which all other connections gradually developed from the sixteenth 
century onwards. 1 
 Between the 1520s and early 1580s the Irish became politically involved with France 
for the first time, when several Irish lords sought French assistance in their campaigns against 
the British Crown. The shared religion of much of France and Ireland made it important for 
the former to at least appear sympathetic to the cause of Irish Catholic subjects of a Protestant 
monarchy, but there was no sign of French military aid for Irish campaigns.2 An important 
landmark in Franco-Irish connections was the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which resulted in 
the defeat and exile of the Catholic King James II and the ascent to the English, Irish and 
Scottish throne of his son-in-law, the Dutch Protestant stadhouder William of Orange. The 
exiled king and his supporters, the Jacobites, were provided asylum in France by Louis XIV 
and his court settled in a château near Versailles. Many Irishmen who had fought for James II 
chose to follow him into exile. This ‘flight of the Wild Geese’ was a collective move on a 
much bigger scale than the Irish soldiers entering the service of Spain and France earlier in 
																																																						
1 M. Lyons, Franco-Irish Relations, 1500-1610: Politics, Migration and Trade (Suffolk, 2003), p. 11. 
2 Lyons, Franco-Irish Relations, pp. 20-21.  
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the seventeenth century.3 Between 14,000 and 19,000 Irishmen and their families settled in 
France and joined the forces of the French monarch. Towards the end of the ancien régime 
the Irish Brigade constituted three of the 101 regiments of infantry in the French Army, of 
which two units fought against British troops in the American War of Independence, where 
France supported the American revolutionaries from 1777 onwards.4  
 Franco-Irish connections before the French Revolution were thus primarily 
commercial, with trade ties going back as far as the beginning of the fifteenth century, but 
became increasingly political with the Irish Jacobites in the French army and the continuous 
warfare between France and England. However, it was not until the establishment of the 
French Republic and the revolutionary wars that the relationship between France and Ireland 
was to be radically changed, and Ireland was to be incorporated into French political strategy 
as never before.  
 
1.2 The political situation in Ireland in 1795  
France cannot be seen as a ‘natural ally’ of Ireland in the period before the French Revolution 
in the way it is seen afterwards. The majority Catholic population was traditionally pro-
French, as France was seen as an ally of the Jacobites and generally as a fellow Catholic 
people.5 But even though they were a majority within the country, Irish Catholics did not hold 
political power. In the seventeenth century their lands had been confiscated and transferred to 
imported English Protestant settlers. This Anglican elite, known as ‘the Ascendancy’ held the 
power in the Irish parliament, and they understood that their power rested on the oppression 
of the majority Catholic population. This was realized through the implementation of the 
																																																						
3 N. Genet-Rouffiac, ‘The Wild Geese in France: a French perspective’ in N. Genet-Rouffiac & D. Murphy ed., 
Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590-1945 (Dublin, 2009) pp. 32-54 at pp. 32-34. 
4 S. Scott, ‘The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France’ in Gough and Dickson, Ireland and the 
French Revolution, p. 14.  
5 EP, p. 3.  
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Penal Laws in the first half of the eighteenth century, which ensured that Catholics would 
never be able to acquire property or any position of power, nor could they influence politics in 
any way.6 Catholic society remained largely leaderless and politically powerless: the 
hierarchy chose to preach obedience to those in power and condemn riots and rebellions.7 
Without a structured movement the Catholic majority could not regain their rights and instead 
lashed out in local agrarian warfare.8 
The early forms of Irish nationalism and anti-English sentiment did therefore not arise 
within the oppressed Catholic community, but with Protestants in the form of ‘Patriotism’, a 
term given to politicians who strived for constitutional reforms, legislative independence from 
England, and free trade regulation. The Patriots were aided in their political reform movement 
by the outbreak of war in America and the French support for the American revolutionaries, 
which made an invasion of Ireland a real possibility for the first time since 1759.9 Ireland did 
not have an official militia, and the sense of insecurity and lack of sufficient sources of 
protection nearby led to the mobilization of the Irish people in Volunteers corps. The 
Volunteers became the spearhead of a renewed and general Patriot agitation for free trade and 
Irish legislative independence, which they achieved in 1782.10  
The reform movement of this period slowly diminished, but a core radical group of 
Volunteers, particularly in Ulster, remained. Catholic emancipation became a divisive point of 
discussion, with several Belfast Volunteers pursuing the creation of a new political club 
uniting Catholics and Protestants.11 Tone, a Presbyterian, Trinity College-educated barrister, 
was one of them.12 The idea of a union between Catholics and Protestants was first rejected by 
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a majority during a meeting of Volunteers in July 1791, but Tone’s pamphlet An Argument on 
behalf of the Catholics in Ireland united the ranks behind his ideas:  
To oppose the unconstitutional weight of Government, subject as that 
Government is to the still more unconstitutional and unjust bias of English 
influence, it is absolutely necessary that the weight of the people's scale should 
be increased. This object can only be attained by a Reform in Parliament and 
no reform is practicable that shall not include the Catholics.13 
 
Tone was invited to Belfast in north-east Ulster, where the Society of the United Irishmen was 
founded on 18 October 1791, and James Napper Tandy, a Dublin merchant and Volunteer 
commander who had been part of the reformist Whig club,  subsequently set up its Dublin 
counterpart.14 It is important to note that the aims of the United Irishmen were not initially to 
form a republic, nor did they seek separation from England. Rather, they were striving for a 
limited, dual monarchy, where the King of England were to be King of Ireland too, instead of 
King of England ruling over Ireland. It was British ministerial control over the Irish 
parliament of which they complained.  
The French Revolution contributed to the founding of the Society and helped forge its 
identity. A Volunteer demonstration in support of the French revolution on 14 July 1791 in 
Belfast, celebrating the fall of the Bastille, revived the reform movement that led to the 
establishment of the United Irishmen. This was not the only celebration of French republican 
success: they again celebrated this event in 1792, and the Belfast Volunteers also met to 
celebrate the French victory at Valmy in October 1792.15 They even sought to set up an Irish 
National Guard, following the French example, and were generally great admirers of the 
French army.16 A few Irish radicals had visited Paris in 1792 and joined the United Irishmen 
afterwards, such as Arthur O’Connor and Lord Edward FitzGerald. Because they left before 
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the French policy towards foreigners became hostile, they were not rejected by the French, as 
other patriot groups were, and they brought back a positive image of French goodwill.17 
France was adopted as the United Irishmen’s revolutionary model, and continued to support 
the country throughout the Terror and its bloodshed, and the execution of the royal family. 
The outbreak of the war between England and France in 1793 changed the position of the 
United Irishmen: because of their francophilia, they assumed the role of an anti-war party, 
which isolated them from the rest of the parliamentary opposition and invited repression from 
the government.18 But however enamoured they might have been with republican ideals and 
symbols, it was yet unthinkable that their affiliation with the French Revolution extended to a 
call for French assistance in Ireland.19  
The following two years would change that position, when ‘all the gains of the last 
two decades had been lost and the constitutional channels through which the popular will 
could influence parliament closed.’20 The republicanism in spirit developed into a full-blown, 
militant republicanism. This development cannot be seen separately from the sectarian divide 
in Ireland, and the deep-rooted fear among Protestants that a Catholic mass uprising could 
occur at any moment against them. From 1792 to 1795 this fear was more rational than 
before; as Elliott states, latent Catholic hopes of a reversal of the land settlement came to the 
fore with the campaign of the United Irishmen for Catholic relief and the creation of a 
Catholic committee to discuss these matters.21 The prospect of a Catholic uprising was 
strengthened by the rapid spread of the militant Catholic Defenders. In the years 1792-3, 
while the United Irishmen were still uncertain of their identity and aims, the Defenders 
instigated violent conflict in several counties and confiscated arms from Protestants. Together 
with the declaration of war against France, this triggered a harsh reaction by the Irish 
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government, where several repressive laws and war efforts were easily supported, even by the 
opposition that had been so vocal about reforms in the decade before.22  
Although the United Irishmen tried to avert the violence, and confirmed their rejection 
of republicanism as a form of government, they became the government’s target of 
suppression. The Irish government could simply not believe that the riots were caused by 
Catholic masses without a clearly defined leadership, and held the United Irishmen and 
Volunteers responsible. While the 1790s began for the United Irishmen with a sense of 
optimism about reform by constitutional means, the ‘betrayal’ of the parliamentary opposition 
and the accusations of being a treasonable organization left them stunned and helpless. While 
the government was convinced that the United Irishmen were already militant republicans, it 
was its repression and rejection of all reform that pushed the United Irishmen from moderate 
to radical means. And it was in this time, when all hope seemed lost for their reforms, that the 
French reached out.  
  
1.3 The political situation in France in 1795 
At the time the French government agreed to support an Irish effort for revolution, France had 
just been going through a tumultuous and violent period, and conflicts and civil war were still 
raging in parts of the country. This section will not describe the causes of the French 
Revolution or go into detail about its consequences.23 But it is important to see the Directory 
and its decisions in the context of the the Terror and Revolutionary Wars, since they also 
influenced its policy. Moreover, this period marks the beginning of contact between France 
and Irish revolutionaries.   
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 The French declaration of war against Prussia and Austria on 20 April 1792 was the 
start of a series of wars that would carry on until 1802.24 War was advocated by a group 
within the National Assembly called the Girondins, who sought a conflict not only to defeat 
France’s opponents, but to spread the ideas of the revolution and destroy the ancien régimes 
all over Europe. After a difficult start they began winning a series of victories in the winter of 
1792-1793, and were on the offensive in Belgium, Savoy, Nice and the German Rhineland. 
Girondin war strategy was implemented as policy by the National Convention in the last 
months of 1792: A first decree stated that the French nation would give fraternity and 
assistance to any people wishing to recover its liberty, a second stated that wherever French 
armies penetrated, they would abolish nobility, feudal privileges, tithes and monarchs and 
introduce representative assemblies to organize a republican constitution. However, the scale 
of French expansion and the execution of the royal family brought about a massive alliance of 
powers, known as the First Coalition, and France was no longer at war with just Austria and 
Prussia, but with Britain, Spain, Holland, Portugal and several Italian states as well. 
Weakened by failures in war, the Girondins were ousted from power and the more radical 
opponents, the Montagnards, lead by Robespierre, took control of the National Assembly on 
31 May 1793. Supported by the popular movement, the sans-culottes, they introduced a 
government of Terror. The dictatorial, Revolutionary government mobilised the entire 
economic resources of the nation to support the war effort and used the revolutionary tribunal 
to eliminate dissent and crush internal opposition and civil war.25 
 The bloodshed of the Terror triggered the eventual fall of Robespierre on 27 July 1794 
(9 Thermidor II in the Republican calendar) and the Thermidorian Reaction. This was a 
general retreat from the political and economic radicalism that had characterized 
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Robespierre’s reign and strove to restore order and put an end to the popular revolution 
promoted by the Montagnards.26 During this period a new constitution was established that 
created the Directory, the government’s executive power consisting of five Directors: 
LaRevellière, a Girondin known for his anti-clericalism, took on religion; Reubell, known to 
support policies of annexation, took on diplomacy; Barras, a military man of great 
importance, took on the police; and Carnot, who had a longstanding career in the French 
Revolutionary Army, took on military administration, while his ally Letourneur became the 
naval expert.27 They had a difficult task ahead of them: France was in a state of economic 
chaos, warfare with multiple foreign countries and civil war within the country, and the 
Directory had the task to bring back the peace, but had to do so on Republican terms, to create 
a Republican order.28  
 At the start of the outbreak of war with England, France had no intention of promoting 
disturbance in Britain; they were still unsure of their strategy towards England and saw her as 
a potential ally. But when England started to meddle in the Vendée in West-France, where a 
surge of royalist opposition to the Revolution had escalated into civil war, France sought 
revenge, and turned towards Ireland as a possibility. Several memoranda addressed to the 
Committee of Public Safety, the executive government during the Terror, detail the situation 
in Ireland, addresses from the French Republic to ‘the people of Ireland’ were made and 
several secret agents were dispatched on Irish missions.29 This interest in Ireland was renewed 
with the establishment of the Directory, as Carnot harboured an intense hatred of England, 
while LaRevellière brought republican internationalism into the Directory, favouring a policy 
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of conquests as a means of liberating other countries.30 A renewed political connection 
between France and Ireland thus emerged during a tumultuous period in French politics: a 
time where great war efforts were combined with internal purges, followed by the uncertainty 
and indecisiveness of the Thermadorian reaction. The Directory not only had the task to 
rebuild the nation’s order, it had to do so while adhering to Republican ideals, and 
simultaneously addressing foreign threats. At the same time, the United Irishmen became 
increasingly radical and militant as the Irish government backed down from reform and 
oppressed every form of opposition. The United Irishmen, once abhorred by the idea of 
reaching out to the French, began to see a French invasion as the only way out of this 
situation. It was during this period that one of the leading United Irishmen, Theobald Wolfe 
Tone, left Ireland and made his way to France.  
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Chapter 2: Liberating Ireland: the expedition of 1796 
2.1: The arrival of Tone and the foundation of the first expedition 
On 3 April 1794 an Irish, Anglican clergyman, William Jackson, arrived in Dublin. He was 
sent on a secret mission by the French government to inform them of Irish and English 
opposition politicians and how they saw a French invasion of England or Ireland. 1 He spoke 
with several United Irishmen, including Tone, who distrusted Jackson and saw him as a 
possible English spy. Nevertheless, Tone told Jackson that he wanted independence, as 
something ‘worth risking all to obtain’. Jackson then stated that, if this were the case, they 
could expect assistance from France.2 However, Jackson was arrested on 26 April 1794 for 
high treason.3 In the indictment Tone is named as someone persuaded by Jackson to travel to 
France to convince them to invade Ireland.4 When Jackson’s trial commenced a year later, 
Tone struck a deal with the government and set off to Philadelphia on 14 June 1795, from 
where he arranged to go to France.5 
 In a letter dated 14 December 1795, the Minister Plenipotentiary of France in the 
United States, equivalent to the function of ambassador, Adet, wrote to the French 
government (more specifically, he wrote to the Committee of Public Safety, which had by 
then been replaced by the Directory) to introduce Tone, who had proved ‘son attachement á la 
liberté.’6 Tone would give the letter when he arrived in Paris. In the letter Adet stated that 
Tone’s information on Ireland meant that it would be sufficient to help an insurrection that 
had been organized already. Tone would be able to point out to the French government all 
necessary means for ‘l’emancipation d’un Peuple opprimé, et l’abaissement de la nouveau 
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Carthage’7 – Adet equals England to Carthage, the great enemy of the Roman Empire. This is 
an important justification given for helping an Irish insurrection; both a Republican ideal of 
liberty and the hope for English destruction are mentioned.8 This letter was followed by a 
report from Minister of External Relations Delacroix, to the Directory on the discontent of the 
Irish people. In this report, they spoke again of the oppression of the Irish people by ‘le 
despotisme anglais’, who only awaited a good moment to win back their independence, and 
asked for French assistance to accomplish that ‘généreux destin’. Delacroix stated that the 
moment was there to declare themselves for the Irish and invade Ireland, to ‘délivrer 
[l’Irlande] de la domination anglaise, comme elle [la Republique] en affranchîs l’Amérique.’9 
This again can be seen as a Republican justification for assistance, but what follows is more 
strategic: namely that a successful invasion will also deprive England of an important source 
for their fleet and army, and of its greatest source of industrial wealth.10 At that moment, it 
was deemed premature to take measures to put into action such an important plan, but the 
advice was given to send Tone to Paris and organize an expedition.11  
 Another letter from Adet, dated 27 January 1796, gives more insight into the specifics 
of the expedition and its consequences. He proposed to compose a force of 20,000 French 
soldiers, who would ‘détruira la tyrannie anglaise et rendra la liberté au monde entier’12, since 
England, he claimed, could not exist without Ireland (a statement frequently used in 
memoranda on Ireland as well).13 In terms of the justifications for the expedition, this varied 
from its possibility to weaken or destroy England – a strategist argument – to the republican 
ideal of helping a poor and oppressed people. But significantly, Adet emphasized that, once 
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an invasion of Ireland had taken place, the aim of the French army would be a free Ireland, 
not its conquest, and to guarantee independence and freedom of thought, religion and 
opinion.14 Of course, this is the opinion of an ambassador in the United States, and not of the 
Directory itself.  But his words and his justifications were later used by the Directory and did 
contribute to the way in which the discourse surrounding the expedition developed.  
 On 12 February 1796 Tone arrived in Paris, and six days later he had a meeting with 
Madgett, an Irishmen working at the External Relations office in Paris, to discuss the state of 
Ireland. Tone recalled in his diary that Madgett suggested during this meeting that Ireland 
could rise before a French invasion. Tone fiercely rejected this, saying that as soon as the 
French army arrived, the Irish would certainly rise; but that they needed an army of 20,000 
with a ‘man of reputation’ at its head to trigger a mass uprising in Ireland.15 Even though he 
could not see Ireland rise without French support, Tone was still positive about the chances 
for a successful revolution. He began his first memorandum to the Directory by convincing 
them of the benefits for France. Tone emphasized that Ireland was pivotal to the needs of the 
British army, both in terms of food supply, as well as the supply of men for their service; the 
only way to reduce English power, would be to separate Ireland from Great Britain. He then 
continued by describing the situation in Ireland at that time, and he made some substantial 
claims: that there was a ‘national union’ of Catholics and Dissenters, which was ready to turn 
against a ‘common enemy’, and that all the ‘natural strength’ of Ireland is ‘devoted to France 
and adverse to England.’16 Tone was not the only one who made strong claims about the level 
of republicanism in Ireland. The Irishman William Duckett, who started working as a secret 
agent for France in 1793 and continued to supply information for the French government, 
wrote in a memorandum around the same time: ‘L’esprit du peuple y est favourable à toutes 
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les entreprises des republicains…il n’y a pas aujourd’hui de peuple plus dispose à une 
revolution que le peuple Irlandais.’17 This rhetoric is important for the way the Directory 
justified the first expedition later on. These memoranda were the only sources of information 
they had; information that exaggerated how successful an expedition would be, and how 
happy the majority of Irishmen would be with a French invasion and an Irish revolution.  
 In the beginning of the contact between Tone and the French government, 
communication passed mostly through Madgett and the External Relations office.  But on 24 
February 1796 Tone went directly to Carnot to tell him about his ideas on an Irish expedition 
and the state of Ireland. While communicating with Carnot and his right-hand, General 
Clarke, Tone found out that they had another plan for using Ireland against England: to use a 
chouannerie-strategy in Ireland. The chouannerie was a guerrilla warfare waged by the 
royalist peasantry in the Véndee against the republic (begun under influence of Jean Chouan) 
which plunged the west of France into a civil war.  When open warfare was in their 
disadvantage, the counter-revolutionists reverted to tactics such as cutting off supplies, 
starving the enemy and seizing outposts. Soldiers mixed with civilians, blurring the line of 
warfare, and the strategy was seen as brigandage by the French government and greatly 
frustrated the National Guards that were sent to repress the insurrections.18 The British support 
for the royalists in the Vendée infuriated France, and as Elliott states, France desired to inflict 
the same devastation on Britain. In 1793 General Hoche, who later commanded republican 
troops in the Vendée, had already called for an offensive war on Britain, while Carnot had 
developed an intense hatred of England because of his involvement in the Vendée.19 The idea 
of a counter-chouannerie gained momentum when English ships started supplying French 
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royalists to the region in June 1795, and there were preparations underway by Carnot and 
Hoche in April 1796 for a ‘espèce de chouannerie destinée à agiter l’Angleterre’.20  
The information Tone had given on the Defenders and the agitation they caused in 
Ireland encouraged Carnot to form a plan of an Irish chouannerie, which was communicated 
by Clarke to Tone in a meeting on 2 April.21 Tone opposed this idea, claiming it would only 
produce local warfare, and he wrote another memorandum to Clarke to convince him of the 
disadvantages of the plan; however, Clarke kept bringing the issue up in subsequent 
conversations.22 The idea of a chouannerie in Ireland, which Carnot continued to promote, 
could indicate that Carnot wanted to disrupt England at all costs, and that the establishment of 
an Irish Republic was not his priority; that he mostly wanted to use Ireland to indirectly attack 
England, if it were by means of supporting a revolution, or by creating disruption and local 
warfare. Ultimately, he decided to combine the two strategies, seemingly unaware or 
unconcerned with the conflict of interest between the desire to help Irish republicans and 
flooding Ireland with French brigands.23 
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2.2 Progress in the negotiations: official orders and instructions  
From the end of April onwards Tone showed himself increasingly frustrated with the lack of 
progress in the negotiations. On 30 April 1796 he wrote: 
Called on Clarke again. He is a sad puppy and I am fairly tired of him. Our 
dialogue is always the same. 'Well, General Clarke, I have called to know if 
you have anything to tell me?' Not a word. … so I take my leave as ignorant as 
a horse. I confess I cannot fathom General Clarke's policy in keeping me so 
totally in the dark.24  
 
Tone began to believe that the expedition would not be undertaken at all.25 At this time, the 
Directory was distracted by internal unrest, as Francois Babeuf, a leading figure of the leftist 
Society of the Pantheon in Paris, and his followers created a ‘Conspiracy of the Equals’, who 
propagated an insurrection to restore ‘true democracy and social equality’; they were 
arrestond on 10 May 1796.26 In the end of June, Tone finally received good news from 
General Clarke: he would be appointed to the French army within a month, which would 
mean that the expedition was finally underway.27 Indeed, the imminent threats of continental 
war had been removed and with generals and forces available, the opportunity, means and 
government support finally came together, and it was possible to launch an expedition to 
Ireland.28 On 19 June 1796 the Directory proposed General Hoche as the commander of that 
expedition, and outlined the strategy. Although in this document the Republican ideals are 
briefly mentioned, namely ‘render un pays généreux et mûr pour une revolution à 
l’indépendance et à la liberté qu’il appelle’, most of the statement concerns the advantage of 
Irish independence for France, and how it reduces England to a minor power. Moreover, the 
chouannerie is again mentioned as part of the plan: but it is now directed at Wales and 
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Cornwall, and meant as a distraction to contribute to the independence of Ireland.29 Three days 
later, Carnot personally wrote to Hoche again, to express his own views: that he sees in the 
success of the operation ‘la chute du plus irréconciliable et du plus dangereux de nos 
ennemis’ which would bring peace and quiet to France for centuries to come, and that it 
would open up a great career of glory for Hoche. Again, the Vendée and the chouannerie 
were mentioned: to bring a fatal blow to those who are responsible for that ‘cancer’. Carnot 
thus once again justified the expedition to Ireland with his great hatred for England and his 
mission to bring the country down for good.30  
 On 19 July 1796, more than five months after the arrival of Tone in Paris, the 
Directory issued its official instructions to General Hoche for the expedition to Ireland. The 
rhetoric that the Directory used to describe its reasons for the expedition shows the ways in 
which they justified it. More than in the earlier deliberations of the Directory and letters to 
Hoche, the focus is on Republican ideals and on the plan for Ireland once the invasion of 
French troops had succeeded and the Irish Revolution had been set in motion. It starts with 
the claim that the Directory wanted Hoche to liberate Ireland: ‘C'est à vous que la République 
française remet le soin de rendre la liberté à un peuple généreux qui la désire et qui est 
impatient de secouer le joug tyrannique de l'Angleterre.’31 Hoche was informed that the 
inhabitants of Ireland strongly desired to live under a republic government, and that he was to 
strengthen that desire with all means. The goal was a permanent alliance between France and 
Ireland, which would be more likely when their government system resembled the French 
system. But the order also stated clearly that, at least in the beginning, Irish government 
should be subject to the French Republic, and that government agents should consult with 
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Hoche on all occasions, and could not act without his specific order.’32 The letter then turned 
more towards the benefits of a successful invasion for France: the Directory assumed that the 
Irish would compensate them for their ‘sacrifices’ through hostility to England, their ‘ennemi 
commun’ and that Ireland would grant French commerce all the advantages that Ireland could 
provide.33 Moreover, Hoche’s efforts should be directed towards ‘donner à la nation irlandaise 
un chef du pays bien disposé en faveur de la France et bien connu comme ennemi passionné 
de l'Angleterre.’34 He should also avoid religious conflict as much as possible, and should the 
Catholics abandon their faith, they should be kept from adopting Anglicanism or 
Presbyterianism, which would ‘bring them closer to the English.’35 This clearly shows that the 
French supported the Irish rebels, but they needed certainty that Ireland would become their 
ally against England, instead of a properly independent state with no allegiance to France.  
 However, in the event that the English began to prevail, the Directory wanted to avoid 
surrender to England at any cost. Instead, Hoche was instructed to separate his forces, start a 
chouannerie and resist until France sent reinforcements. Carnot’s idea of making Ireland the 
English Vendée had thus not been totally removed from the official strategy; but it was only 
seen as a last option, a plan B, in case the invasion and insurrection failed. On the other hand, 
if the Irish revolution succeeded and a republic was assured, the Directory authorized Hoche 
to invade England, with reinforcements that the Irish troops could provide.36  
 The Republican ideals of liberation and relief from an (English) monarchy that 
oppressed the people of Ireland were primarily used as the justification for this expedition, 
and the instructions contain detailed plans for Hoche to ensure a transition to a republican 
system. But the expedition was primarily justified by showing the advantages of Irish 
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independence from England for the French Republic: the weakening of England, especially its 
military forces; the creation of a strong ally so close to England; and a base from which 
France could invade England. Moreover, they intended to create chaos and civil war if their 
initial plan did not work, by starting a chouannerie.  
  
2.3 A chaotic expedition and its aftermath  
Tone mentioned several victories of the French army in the end of June, on the Italian front, 
in his diary, along with the spoils it brought.37 As Elliott states, the Italian campaign changed 
the Directory’s war strategy: it made the southern and eastern armies more important, and it 
fuelled an already existing strong rivalry between General Hoche and the general of the 
Italian mission, Napoleon Bonaparte. Hoche was determined to make Ireland his glorious 
victory, as Italy had been Bonaparte’s.  
But the Directory’s attention – and with that, most of the troops – had turned away 
from the Irish expedition after Austria broke the armistice in July and marched into the 
Rhineland. The preparations for the Irish expedition were frustrated by lack of finance, 
supplies, and sailors.38 This changed with the arrival in Paris of Lord Malmesbury, 
ambassador from England, who had come to negotiate peace. On 23 October 1796 the 
Directory instructed Minister Delacroix to prepare himself for these negotiations and gave 
him all necessary powers to conclude a treaty.39 This might seem as another sign that the 
Directory had lost confidence in the Irish expedition; but as Elliott argues, it is more likely 
that this triggered the Directory to speed up the preparations for an invasion. ‘We must 
humble the pretensions of this envoy of [Prime Minister] Pitt’s’, wrote Minister of the Navy, 
Truguet to Hoche, ‘by opening our discussions with the words – twenty-thousand men are in 
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Ireland.’40 With a successful invasion of Ireland as a pressure tool, England would have been 
forced to make peace on French terms. The way in which the Directory justified, after a 
period of apparent disinterest, the acceleration of Irish preparations adds an extra layer to their 
variety of justifications: now the expedition could be used as a means to negotiate peace with 
England on advantageous terms.       
 After weeks of indecisiveness and problems with the preparations, Hoche’s expedition 
embarked from Brest on 16 December 1796 with 14,450 troops – including Tone, in the rank 
of ‘chef de brigade’41– leaving instructions for General Hédouvillle to prepare reinforcements 
of the same number. Hoche’s expedition became a complete failure due to a lack of 
communication between ships and extreme weather conditions. Hoche became separated of 
the rest of the fleet, which arrived at Bantry Bay, in the south-west of Ireland, on 21 
December; but the naval commander, Bouvet, refused to land due to storm. Added to this was 
a lack of support or recognition from the Irish people for the ships that had entered Bantry 
Bay; while the sailors were expecting to be hailed in by the Irish as liberators, there was no 
sign of enthusiasm from the local population. Hoche never even made it to the Irish coast, and 
returned to France on 31 December, having learnt of the failed mission in Bantry.42  
To make matters even worse, a new mission was sent to Bristol on the west coast of 
England, with ‘troublemakers’ on board that Carnot had foreseen as a driving force for a 
chouannerie, such as prisoners and a troublesome regiment from the Ile d’Oléron. Elliott sees 
this expedition as ‘something of a mystery’, since the Directory had already shut down 
Hédouville’s preparations for another expedition.43 But it is possible that this was to be a new 
version of the ‘Plan B’ of Carnot, to sow chaos in England and start a new chouannerie, as 
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laid out in instructions written by Carnot himself.44 This expedition failed as well and led to 
heavy criticism of the Directory in France, which isolated Carnot from its councils.  
The Irish expeditions had severely weakened the French navy and the French councils 
that were supposed to be consulted on these expeditions were outraged that they were kept in 
the dark. Moreover, the Irish had not risen when French forces approached Bantry Bay, which 
was taken as proof that the Irish agents, such as Tone and Duckett, had exaggerated the 
republicanism and desire for independence in Ireland and could no longer be trusted. 
Therefore, the decision of the Directory to support Ireland again in 1798 was an unlikely 
outcome. The next chapter will analyse how the French government justified this second 
military expedition.   
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Chapter 3: A second chance for Ireland 
3.1: New priorities in French war strategy 
 
After the initial devastation over the failed expedition, Tone pulled himself together and 
started making plans for his future. His wife and children had arrived in Hamburg and he 
wished to settle in Nanterre, in order to stay close to Paris and keep the communication lines 
open with the Directory. In his diary he described a meeting with General Hoche, who had 
just been named command of the Army of Sambre and Meuse. Tone saw this as the decisive 
sign that another expedition to Ireland was not likely to take place in the foreseeable future. 
However, Hoche told Tone that support for Ireland had not disappeared, but rather lack of 
money and the damage done to the fleet during the first expedition had led to the suspension 
of another expedition. The Directory had employed Hoche and the troops of the Irish forces 
elsewhere in the meantime, but he wanted to return as soon as preparations for another 
expedition were to resume. However, the Directory had its focus on other matters at this time; 
as Tone mentioned in his diary, Bonaparte had defeated Austria again at Rivoli in northern 
Italy. Tone hoped this might lead to a peace with ‘the Emperor’ which would make it easier to 
focus on England.1 Indeed, Bonaparte negotiated the preliminaries of a peace treaty with 
Austria, which were accepted on 18 April 1797. Together with the successful Italian 
campaign of Bonaparte and the establishment of the Batavian Republic, England was left as 
the only member of the First Coalition still at war with France.2  
Meanwhile, Hoche did not abandon the Irish cause, and Bonaparte’s victories fuelled 
their rivalry and Hoche’s yearning for a triumphant expedition. The Directory however was 
holding back on support for another operation. In the end of May 1797 Hoche met Lewins, a 
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United Irishmen agent.3 While the failed expedition to Ireland and the lukewarm reception of 
French ships by the Irish had discouraged the French government, it had caused an upsurge in 
enthusiasm for the United Irishmen, whose membership tripled in the beginning of 1797, and 
Lewins was chosen to go to Hamburg and re-open communications with France.4 Hoche then 
sent his adjutant-general Simon to Paris to press the Directory and the Minister of Navy on 
the Irish cause.5 Simon wrote to Hoche on 7 June 1797 that the Directory was still willing to 
send support to the Irish, but that there was no sign of any preparations being considered. 
Simon had met with Carnot, who had responded verbally to him on a letter from 
Hoche. The Directory would not expose any ships or considerable troops to the English, who 
were ‘absolument maitres de la mer’. According to Carnot, there was an agreement with the 
Batavian Republic to make available as many troops and arms as they could spare, and Hoche 
would be in charge of arranging this; a big expedition however, was not on the table at that 
moment. In the peace negotiations with England the interests of Ireland would be stipulated 
and directed towards the wishes of the Irish population, but the legislative council could not 
recognize Ireland as an independent state before the independence was established. The 
Directory told Hoche to do everything that he deemed right for the Irish cause and to consult 
with the Batavian Republic.6 Clearly, the Directory did not wish to take any more 
responsibility on the matter and although they did not prevent the Batavian Republic and 
Hoche from collaborating, they would not guarantee any support. This was further confirmed 
by an official statement from the Directory to Hoche two days later, in which they offered 
their help to Ireland but without a plan for an actual expedition: ‘Notre intérêt est de les voir 
proclamer l'indépendance de leur île … mais sans garantie de notre part … Nous n'avons 
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contracté aucun engagement de maintenir leur nouvel état politique, dans la crainte de nuire 
au rétablissement de la paix.'7  
Hoche presented the information given by Simon as positive news to Tone and Lewins 
– or at least, Tone interpreted it as positive.8 In reality, the Directory withdrew from any 
commitment to Ireland, and let the Dutch take responsibility instead; they were too occupied 
with trying to make peace with the English. On 1 June 1797 an official note from 
Westminster on behalf of the Crown asked France to enter peace negotiations.9 These took 
place in Lille during the summer of 1797, from 17 June until 21 September. The Dutch 
government subsequently delayed their plans for an Irish expedition until they knew the 
outcome of these negotiations.10 Meanwhile, a coup within the Directory had taken place to 
get rid of Carnot and Barthélemy, who had just joined the Directory; the three other Directors, 
Barras, La Revelliére and Reubell, saw the rise of royalists within the legislative assemblies 
as a threat to the Republic while Carnot and Barthélemy were willing to compromise with 
them.11 On the night of 3 September Barthélemy was arrested and Carnot, who had been 
warned, fled to Germany.12 Carnot had always been one of the biggest advocates of an 
expedition to Ireland and was, together with General Hoche, one of the most informed 
politicians on the situation there. The final blow to this expedition came with the sudden 
death, of consumption, of General Hoche on 19 September 1797.13  
At the same time, the peace negotiations between England and France had come to 
nothing: ‘nous devons regarder les négociations comme absolument rompues’, stated the 
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newly appointed minister of External Relations, Talleyrand.14 On 29 September 1797 the 
Directory officially declared the negotiations over. Tone saw this as ‘excellent news’, because 
it meant a continuation of war against England.15 And it is true that the Directory justified 
their lack of support for an Irish expedition by pointing towards the peace negotiations. But 
the promotion of the Irish cause suffered a painful blow by Carnot’s removal from power and 
the loss of Hoche, who was the driving force behind a second expedition.  
 
3.2: Against all odds: a second expedition to Ireland 
Hoche’s death and Carnot’s dismissal were serious inconveniences to the Irish negotiators in 
Paris, since their successors, Director Barras and General Bonaparte, were uninformed about 
the Irish cause and had not nearly as much personal attachment to it as Hoche. Despite all 
these setbacks, the Directory decided to launch another expedition in the summer of 1798. 
This time it was easier to justify the decision, because the circumstances were now as France 
hoped they would have been in 1796: Ireland had rebelled on its own, and France could now 
support a revolution, instead of starting one.  
In a letter to Barras on 25 September 1797, Lewins (who had, by then, become the 
official ambassador for the United Irishmen in Paris) asked for assurance that the promises to 
the United Irishmen that Hoche made – 10,000 men, arms and ammunition to be ready by the 
end of October – would be honoured. Barras responded that they were as determined as ever 
to ‘rescue’ the Irish: but that they had to wait until spring. He promised Lewins that once a 
definite peace with Austria had been concluded, they could ‘compter sur votre 
independance’.16 	No document clearly sets out why the Directory continued preparing for an 
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Irish expedition – although the failure of peace negotiations with England combined with the 
peace treaty with Austria a month later, can be seen on its own as a justification: England was 
once again the only French enemy left. However, after Hoche’s death, the plan for Irish 
support was to be completely incorporated into the war strategy against England. Following 
the communication between Lewins and Barras, the only extant communication regarding 
Ireland was from Tone, who discussed plans with the Dutch general Daendels, responsible for 
the preparations that were still ongoing in the Batavian Republic. Tone was also introduced to 
Talleyrand and the new Minister of War, Schérer, and later Bonaparte as well, who was made 
commander of the new Armée de l’Angleterre – something Tone saw as very positive.17 At the 
same time, the pressure from Ireland increased with the arrival of several United Irishmen in 
Paris,  including the founder of Dublin’s United Irishmen, James Napper Tandy.18 These 
Irishmen insisted fiercely on the strength of rebelliousness in Ireland; they understated the 
military needs of the United Irishmen, and exaggerated the revolutionary capabilities of the 
Irish people. Moreover, Tandy expected to assume natural leadership in the negotiations, and 
tried to obstruct Tone and Lewins’ efforts.19   
A letter at the end of 1797 gives more clarity on the justifications used for the 
expedition. Barras used stronger language to confirm that they were working on the 
expedition, saying that it would be executed in spring with the ‘grandissimes moyens’, and he 
clearly stated that the goal of the expedition was not a conquest, but the overthrow of English 
government and independence for Ireland.  However, Barras emphasized that English defeat 
was the priority, although the Directory would give the United Irishmen all the means to take 
action themselves.20 These justifications correspond to the absence of documents referring 
																																																						
17 WTWT ii, ‘Diary 30 September/29 November, 21/23 December 1797’, pp.176-177, 185.  
18 AD/CP/A/592, fol. 65, Letter from the Minister of External Relations to the Minister of Police, 20 October 
1797.  
19 EP, pp. 170-171.  
20 AN/AF/IV/1671/2, fol. 176, Verbal response from Barras to Lewins, end of 1797. Translation: Greatest 
means. 
	 39	
directly to Ireland, instead of to an English expedition: England was seen as a priority, and the 
Irish independence as a sideshow, for which they would provide some means, but for which 
the actions were the Irishmen’s own responsibility.   
However, right after this promise of a great English expedition in April, the Directory 
radically changed course by allowing Bonaparte to take his forces to Egypt. In the beginning 
of January 1798, Bonaparte was still busy with organizing the armée d’Angleterre, raising 
money, artillery and men.21 On 26 January however, Talleyrand and Bonaparte met and first 
discussed the idea of a conquest of Egypt. Between 8 and 20 February, Bonaparte inspected 
the troops destined for an English invasion, and on 23 February Bonaparte presented the 
Directory with a memorandum stating that the invasion of England was almost impossible, 
and that either an expedition to the East or a conclusion of peace with England would be 
better possibilities. On 5 March, the Directory agreed to entrust Bonaparte with an expedition 
to Egypt, and on 12 April the ‘armée d’Orient’ was created, commanded by Bonaparte – he 
sailed on 19 May.22 In a report to the Directory, Bonaparte proposed to embark on the mission 
with 20,000 to 25,000 men and 2,000 to 3,000 cavalry.23 How could the Directory justify 
launching an expedition to Ireland, when all France’s military resources, troops and generals 
were sent to Egypt?  
On 16 June 1798, Tone had lost all faith in an expedition to England or Ireland ever 
happening.24 But only two days later, the French papers spread news of the death of one of the 
United Irishmen leaders, Lord FitzGerald, and of several insurrections. It seems that only by 
then, the Directory received the news of an Irish rebellion, while in fact the rebellion had 
already started in Ireland at the end of May, after Lord FitzGerald, United Irishmen’s military 
																																																						
21 La Fondation, Napoleon Tome II, Letter to Ramel de Nogaret, Ministre des Finances 8 janvier 1798, no.2294; 
Letter to Schérer, Ministre de la Guerre, 9 January 1798, no.2295, p. 25-26.   
22 Ibid., Letter to the Directory, 23 February 1798, no.2315, p. 37-39; Letter to the Directory on board of 
‘L’Orient’, no.2496, p. 129; Chronology p. 1179-1181.  
23 Ibid., Letter to the Directory, 5 March 1798, no.2322, p. 42. 
24 WTWT iii, ‘Diary 16 June 1798’, p. 298.  
	 40	
leaders, and several other United Irishmen leaders had been arrested on 19 and 20 May. 
Initially, the Irish and English governments were astonished by the ferocity of the rebel 
forces, but after English reinforcements were sent, they were able to suppress the rebellion by 
the middle of June.25 The moment the news arrived in Paris, an appeal for help was made by a 
group of United Irishmen in Paris to the French Minister of External Relations.26 There are no 
documents from the Directory with instructions to generals in the same way as the 
instructions to General Hoche were written down for the first expedition. But in an address of 
the legislative council of the Directory on the Irish cause, July 14, the same rhetoric is used as 
then:  
Tous les hommes libres, tous ceux qui veulent le devenir sont nos frères; mais 
ils le sont bien plus particulièrement encore ceux dont les efforts se dirigent 
contre un gouvernement orgueilleux et perfide … L’Irlande ne donne pas 
seulement un grand et vertueux exemple de plus aux nations: elle combat 
encore pour l’Europe entière.27  
 
The address stated that the Directory already knew what to do, that the circumstances forced 
them to act, but that they were allowed to form their plans in secret. The secrecy corresponds 
to a lack of documents explicitly stating an expedition to Ireland. One letter described the 
state of the troops in Brest and LaRochelle ‘pour des expéditions sécrètes’ and ‘expéditions 
que vous avez déterminés’.28 The address reveals how the Directory justified the second 
expedition: because they needed to help their Irish brothers, who had been brave enough to 
stand up to their enemy; and because that enemy was England, the greatest enemy of the 
French and – according to them – of all of Europe. It is another example of how the Directory 
blended their hatred for England with the Republican ideal of liberty and independence for 
																																																						
25 EP, pp. 201-207.  
26 AD/CP/A/592, fol. 227, ‘The Address of a Number of United Irishmen … to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the French Republic’, 21 June 1798.  
27 Ibid., fol. 191, ‘Conseil des cinq cents – Corps Legaslitif,’ 14 July 1798. Translation: All free men and men 
who want to become free are our brothers: but they are more so when their efforts concentrate on an arrogant and 
treacherous country… Ireland does not only set a great and virtuous example for other nations: she fights for the 
whole of Europe, for the human cause. 
28 AN/AF/III/149, fol.98-99, Report from the Ministry of War to the Directory, 16 August 1798. Translation: 
Secret expeditions, expeditions as you have determined 
	 41	
Ireland. But the justification can also be concluded from the two years of negotiations 
between the United Irishmen and France: the idea of succeeding where the last expedition had 
gone wrong and the ongoing preparations, partly delegated to the Batavian Republic, that kept 
the idea of an Irish expedition in the back of the Directory’s mind, even though Napoleon’s 
plan for Egypt had been approved. And then the Irish themselves, who finally met the most 
important condition for French aid: they had risen on their own, and now France could help 
them to win.  
 
3.3: The Republic of Connacht  
The Directory had initiated plans for the second expedition in the end of June. An 
expeditionary force of 8,000 would sail to Ireland under General Hardy, and while it was 
being prepared, two smaller forces would in the meantime sail under General Rey from 
Dunkirk and General Humbert from Rochefort. The rush to help the Irish in their rebellion 
was significantly slowed down by a lack of money, supplies and men.29 Only Humbert had 
worked out a way to raise enough money and supplies and he sailed to Ireland on 5 August 
with a small force of 1,019 men – a move the Directory applauded, but which was criticized 
by other generals as it undermined the strategy of a three-way strike.30 On 22 August Humbert 
and his forces reached Killala Bay in Connacht, and took the town of Killala, while the Irish 
were welcoming the French with open arms.31 ‘The people will join us in myriads, they throw 
themselves on their knees as we pass along and extend their arms for our success. We will be 
masters of Connaught in a few days’, wrote Tone’s brother Matthew, who served with 
Humbert.32 The French forces recruited around 500 to 700 Irishmen (although another account 
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speaks of 1500)33, and according to major-general Muller, they seemed to have shared in their 
spirit of republicanism: ‘un cri general de vive la république francoise s’en fait entendre parmi 
nos troupes. Les Irlandois y on répondu par leur cri de liberté Erin Go Brah!’34 On the 26th 
Humbert and his French and Irish rebel forces marched to Castlebar, defended by Irish forces, 
and won the Battle of Castlebar.  
An important fact is that the French then established a government, a ‘Republic of 
Connacht’. An official declaration describes of a government of 12 members, agreed upon by 
the French army command, with an Irish President, John Moore.35 The fact that they 
established a Republic of Connacht, instead of just occupying the area and waiting for 
reinforcements, adheres to the way in which the expedition had been justified: they wanted to 
liberate the Irish and help them establish a republic, just as they had done in other sister 
republics. The Republic of Connacht was a staging post, from which the republic was to be 
spread to all of Ireland, to achieve a Republic of Ireland.  
After Humbert’s embarkment, extra efforts were made towards sending 
reinforcements, possible to cover up failures in the Egyptian expedition.36 On the 18th of 
September General Kilmaine, who had become the commander of the Armée d’Angleterre 
after Bonaparte left for Egypt, wrote to the Directory that an acceleration of the Irish mission 
might be ‘un moyen de rémédier au malheur arrive dans la méditerranée.’37 However, this 
hope was in vain: Humbert had already been defeated at the battle of Ballinamuck on the 8th 
of September and the reinforcements that were sent withdrew after hearing of Humbert’s 
defeat, or were defeated by the English fleet. Tone, now ranked as adjutant-general, was part 
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of General Bompard’s force, which was defeated and captured by an English squandron under 
Admiral Warren off Lough Swilly. Tone was captured and sent off to Dublin, where he 
committed suicide after he was sentenced to death by public hanging.38 
The question has been asked why the Directory persisted in the idea of an attack on 
England or Ireland: not only had a previous, much larger expedition failed, Bonaparte had 
also advised against it, the Dutch were no longer on board and most of the French forces were 
far away in the Meditteranean. Elliott sees it as a serious misconception on the Directory’s 
part of the rebelliousness in Ireland.39 It is true that while Tone had been careful the first time 
around to insist that the Irish would only rise when France had invaded, the second time there 
was a new group of United Irishmen in Paris that greatly exaggerated the strength of their 
rebel movement in Ireland. Combined with the news of insurrection in Ireland, this proved to 
be enough incentive for the Directory to help them. They could justify the small forces and 
lack of preparations because of the prospect they envisioned of Ireland: that there was a full-
blown revolution underway already, and France would merely bring reinforcements. Once the 
Irish expedition seemed a success, and the Egyptian mission suffered defeat, Ireland became 
even more important for the Directory. The Republican ideals of liberating Ireland and 
establishing a republican government might have been implemented for a short time in 
Connacht, but ultimately war strategy and the prospect of an easy victory were guiding the 
Directory’s justifications for this expedition.   
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Conclusion 
This thesis has analysed the decision-making process behind, and justifications given for the 
two Irish expeditions of 1796 and 1798 within the French political context. While the 
historical debate on these cases simply places them within the French war strategy at that 
time, this thesis shows that it is a more complex story. The Irish cause became part of war 
strategy, but only so because certain players within the government and army became 
attached to the idea of an Irish invasion. The driving force was the wish to defeat the English, 
combined with the timing of war and peace on the continent. Moreover, the Directory did not 
justify the support out of tactical reasons only: the republicanism of the United Irishmen and 
the sense that the Irish people were oppressed, also prominently featured in their 
justifications.  
 The rhetoric used in the decision-making process leading up to the first expedition, 
starting with Adet’s letter and ending with Hoche’s instructions, is a combination of 
Republican ideals of liberty of the Irish people from oppression and independence from the 
ancien regime of English rule, with the strategic value of Ireland as a weapon against the 
great enemy, England. The Directory’s aim was to establish a republican system of 
government in Ireland, but not without France gaining advantage and a base to launch a 
further attack on England. Republicanism and war strategy against England were thus 
intertwined.  
However, the chouannerie strategy shows that Republican ideals were ultimately not 
the priority for the promoters of the Irish expedition, Carnot and Hoche. The use of this form 
of warfare is directly connected to their anglophobia: both had been deeply involved in the 
Vendée civil war and carried great resentment against the English support of the chouannerie. 
Even though Tone insisted that a chouannerie-styled invasion would be a bad idea, the 
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strategy continued to be developed alongside grander plans for an Irish expedition. Its 
ultimate incorporation into the instructions for Hoche, as a ‘Plan B’ in case the battles against 
Irish or English forces were lost, shows that Carnot could not let go of this plan, even when 
strongly advised against it. This was confirmed by the short-lived expedition under the 
command of General Tate to England, with hundreds of brigands aboard. Instigating a 
rebellion and winning independence in Ireland might not have worked, but creating chaos in 
England was clearly seen as a viable alternative. The plan for creating total chaos and civil 
war in Ireland somewhat undermines the case that the expedition was intended to liberate the 
Irish people and establish a republican form of government in Ireland.  
 After the Irish expedition of 1796 had failed, a new mission seemed unlikely. How 
could the Directory justify losing men and material to a people that had not welcomed the 
French to their land? The political circumstances in 1797 and the beginning of 1798 seemed 
to make another expedition even more unlikely: serious peace negotiations with England, a 
coup that ended Carnot’s career and the death of Hoche, which meant that two of the key 
promoters of the Irish cause were eliminated. The green light for Bonaparte’s expedition to 
Egypt meant that Ireland was no longer seen as a useful arena of French war strategy against 
England: defeat of the enemy was to be accomplished in their far-flung colonies. With a great 
part of the army thousands of miles away, the only justification for a new Irish expedition 
could be that Ireland had risen on its own. When that happened, the French Directory reached 
back to the rhetoric of the 1796 expedition by combining the republican ideal of liberty and 
fraternity with the aim to defeat England. The establishment of the Republic of Connacht 
shows that there was an attempt (with a tinge of hubris) to establish a republican system in 
Ireland, and that the republican rhetoric was not entirely for show.  
 The justifications for the two expeditions thus varied greatly. In 1796, it was the 
personal hatred against England of Carnot and Hoche that accelerated the expedition, which 
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was justified by a combination of republican idealism and the prospect of English defeat. The 
1798 attempt was justified by the news of an insurrection in Ireland, which suited the general 
policy of France to only support revolutions that had already started. In both cases however 
the political context and timing were of great importance. In 1796, an armistice on the 
continent provided the Directory with some breathing space and allowed them to go forward 
with the expedition. In 1798, the political circumstances were completely against the Irish 
cause, and the Irish rebellion was the only possible justification for another expedition. All in 
all, the Irish expeditions could not be seen as a structural part of French war strategy, but were 
born out of a combination of political will, personal incentives and timing. However, 
republicanism was part of the justification. The Directory’s task was not only to re-establish 
order in the country, but they had to do so on Republican terms. The rhetoric used in the 
justifications for the Irish expeditions, and the aim to establish an Irish republic, not just 
conquer it, are proof of this mind-set. In this sense, a successful invasion of Ireland might 
have led to an Irish sister-republic. However, the prominence of French interests in the event 
of an Irish revolution - such as the defeat of the English enemy - in the justifications, bring 
nuance to that view, as well as the chouannerie strategy. France might have been the ‘natural 
ally’ of the Irish, but only because France was the natural enemy of England.  
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